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ARTICLE

Characterizing the Preferences and Values of U.S. Recreational Atlantic
Blueﬁn Tuna Anglers
William M. Goldsmith,* Andrew M. Scheld, and John E. Graves
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, College of William & Mary, Post Ofﬁce Box 1346, Gloucester Point,
Virginia 23062, USA

Abstract

The Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna Thunnus thynnus is the target of a recreational ﬁshery along the U.S. East Coast that
is thought to be of considerable economic value. In some years, recreational landings have exceeded the sector’s
annual subquota due to changes in ﬁsh availability, limited predictability of angler effort, and difﬁculties in real-time
monitoring of catch. Understanding the drivers of angler behavior is critical for predicting how effort and harvest may
vary as a function of changing ﬁsh availability, regulations, or costs. To investigate angler decision making, preferences, and values, we surveyed private recreational anglers from Maine to North Carolina and employed discrete
choice experiments to determine how regulatory and nonregulatory trip-speciﬁc variables inﬂuence trip-taking behavior. A latent class-ranked logit model identiﬁed two distinct classes of anglers who exhibited differing preferences in
regard to the importance of nonconsumptive aspects of Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing (e.g., catch and release). Income and
recent Blueﬁn Tuna targeting were the primary determinants of class membership, and higher-income anglers who
had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the past 5 years were signiﬁcantly more likely to be in the class that derives substantive
beneﬁts from nonconsumptive angling activities. An annual consumer surplus exceeding US$14 million was estimated
for the 2015 ﬁshery. We considered potential angler welfare impacts of possible management changes (compensating
surplus) and identiﬁed a large amount of latent effort currently present in the ﬁshery in the form of consumptiveoriented anglers. As a result, liberalization of harvest regulations could potentially lead to a large inﬂux of effort into
the ﬁshery, which could impede the ability of managers to maintain harvest levels within prescribed limits.

Over the past several decades, resource management
scholars have advocated for better integration of the social
sciences into ﬁsheries management (Voiland and Duttweiler 1984; Fenichel et al. 2013). Understanding the
human component of ﬁsheries is important for predicting
how management actions will affect the well-being of ﬁshery participants, as well as for informing the allocation of
ﬁshery resources among competing user groups (Orbach
1980). In addition, without properly understanding the
preferences and motivations of anglers, predicting behavioral responses (e.g., effort and harvest) is difﬁcult and

can potentially undermine management’s effectiveness and
threaten a ﬁshery’s sustainability (Fulton et al. 2011; Fenichel et al. 2013; Hunt et al. 2013). Fishing behavior may,
for example, change as stock status or management strategies change, and simply extrapolating past behavior under
different conditions could lead to inaccurate predictions
(Fulton et al. 2011). Furthermore, while determining the
preferences and motivations of recreational anglers is challenging (compared with commercial ﬁshers, who are often
thought to be largely motivated by proﬁt), understanding
drivers of angler behavior for a given ﬁshery is critical for
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ensuring that the ﬁshery’s beneﬁts are being maximized
(Fedler and Ditton 1994).
The Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna Thunnus thynnus supports a
popular private and for-hire recreational ﬁshery along the
eastern coast of the United States from Maine to North
Carolina (Marcek and Graves 2014). Of the Blueﬁn Tuna
quota allocated to the United States by the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT), 19.7% (195.2 metric tons for 2017) is domestically apportioned to the recreational Angling category by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Highly
Migratory Species (HMS) Management Division (NMFS
2006; NOAA 2017). This subquota is further divided
among Blueﬁn Tuna size-classes and between the northern
and southern regions of the U.S. East Coast, divided at
39°180 N latitude (Great Egg Inlet, New Jersey) in order to
maintain equity in Blueﬁn Tuna access and landings along
the coast (NOAA 2001).
The HMS Management Division uses a combination of
permitting, size and bag limits, and monitoring to keep
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna landings within the Angling category subquota. To recreationally target and harvest Blueﬁn
Tuna and other highly migratory species (e.g., billﬁshes,
sharks, Swordﬁsh Xiphias gladius, and tunas), private vessel
owners must obtain an annual Atlantic HMS Angling permit (NOAA 2002); as of December 31, 2015, there were
12,745 such permits issued for vessels with principal ports
from Maine to North Carolina (B. McHale, NMFS, personal communication). Blueﬁn Tuna harvest is regulated on
a trip level using size and bag limits, which the HMS Management Division reserves the right to adjust over the course
of a season in order to maximize utilization of the Angling
subquota and prevent overages (NOAA 2006). For example, in 2017 Angling permit holders were permitted to retain
two school-size Blueﬁn Tuna (from 69 to <119 cm curved
FL [CFL]) per vessel per day, one large school (from 119 to
<150 cm CFL) or small medium-size (from 150 to <185 cm
CFL) Blueﬁn Tuna per vessel per day, and one large medium (from 185 to <206 cm CFL) or giant-size (≥206 cm
CFL) Blueﬁn Tuna per vessel per year (i.e., an annual trophy) (NOAA 2017). To monitor recreational Blueﬁn Tuna
catch and effort, NMFS administers the Large Pelagics Survey (LPS) from Maine to Virginia from June through October (Foster et al. 2008). In addition, the HMS Management
Division requires Angling permit holders to report any
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna landings or dead discards within
24 h of the end of the trip through the Automated Landings
Reporting System (ALRS), accessed via telephone, internet,
or smartphone (NOAA 2014b, 2017). Reporting via the
ALRS is not required in Maryland and North Carolina,
where catch-card programs exist (NMFS 2013).
Despite these strategies, managing recreational Blueﬁn
Tuna harvest has proven challenging due to interannual
variability in ﬁsh availability, limited predictability of
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angler effort, and difﬁculties in accurate monitoring of
recreational landings. Estimates from the LPS become
available in waves, typically a month (or longer) after the
end of each wave. This lag in data availability limits the
ability of the HMS Management Division to monitor the
Angling category ﬁshery in real-time to inform inseason
management adjustments, which could compromise the
ability to prevent landings overages for the Angling subquota (NMFS 2013; S. McLaughlin, NMFS, personal
communication). In addition, the extremely low compliance of permit holders with the ALRS reporting requirement (10–20%) has impeded its effectiveness as a real-time
monitoring tool (NMFS 2013) (although the 2017 introduction of a smartphone reporting application [app] may
improve compliance). As a result, signiﬁcant subquota
overages can occur. In 2009, for example, recreational
anglers landed an estimated 566 metric tons of Blueﬁn
Tuna—nearly three times the subquota—due to the
increased availability of small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna
resulting from particularly strong recruitment in 2003
(NMFS 2013; ICCAT 2017). This overage occurred even
though the daily retention limit for this size-class in 2009
never exceeded one ﬁsh per vessel per day (NOAA 2009).
Harvest of small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna was subsequently prohibited for the majority of the 2010 and 2011
ﬁshing seasons (NOAA 2010, 2011; NMFS 2013).
Little attention has been given to how Blueﬁn Tuna
availability, regulations, and other factors (e.g., costs)
affect angler effort and ﬁshing behavior. A better understanding of these human dimensions would decrease the
likelihood of overages as the behavioral response to shifting resource conditions could be anticipated and incorporated by managers. In addition, while the economic
impacts of ﬁsheries for Blueﬁn Tuna and other highly
migratory species have been examined (e.g., Bohnsack
et al. 2002; Hutt et al. 2014), the lack of understanding of
individual angler preferences and values limits the ability
of the HMS Management Division to maximize the ﬁshery’s socioeconomic beneﬁts and thus achieve optimum
yield, as is required by the ﬁrst National Standard of the
Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (U.S. Ofﬁce of the Federal Register 2003).
Few studies have examined the factors inﬂuencing the
behavior and decision making of recreational Blueﬁn
Tuna anglers. This lack of information limits the ability of
managers to anticipate shifts in ﬁshing pressure or appropriately balance conservation measures with socioeconomic objectives. Stoll and Ditton (2006) used a
contingent valuation approach to evaluate annual willingness to pay (WTP) for different management scenarios
among recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers in the largely
catch-and-release ﬁshery at Hatteras, North Carolina.
Those authors found, not surprisingly, that WTP was lowest in the least-ﬂexible, catch-and-release-only regulatory
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scenario. The scope of this study was fairly limited, however, and considered the effect of only one attribute, harvest limit, on angler WTP in a single ﬁshing location.
Acknowledging a degree of complexity, Sutton and Ditton
(2001) found that catch-and-release behavior in the Hatteras Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshery varied according to angler preferences and lifestyle, and additionally suggested that
situational variables, such as ﬁsh size, may be important
in Blueﬁn Tuna recreational angler decision making.
The purposes of this study were twofold. First, we aimed
to improve the capacity of managers for predicting private
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing effort and harvest by evaluating the decision making and preferences of anglers. Second, we endeavored to identify the magnitude and sources
of economic welfare derived from the ﬁshery by anglers in
order to inform management strategies that maximize
angler beneﬁts while maintaining landings within biologically acceptable limits. In addition, we examined the potential sources of heterogeneity acting on decision making and
the derived value of the ﬁshery by Blueﬁn Tuna anglers.
METHODS
We surveyed private recreational anglers permitted to
target Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna along the U.S. East Coast
from Maine to North Carolina during the spring and early
summer of 2016. The survey consisted of two main parts:
(1) a sequence of stated-choice questions regarding hypothetical ﬁshing trips to investigate decision making, preferences, and tradeoffs, and to identify individual angler
beneﬁts; and (2) a series of direct questions regarding
angling behavior, attitudes, and demographics.
Survey design and delivery.— In stated-choice surveys,
individuals are presented with hypothetical, multi-attribute
alternatives (i.e., ﬁshing trips) and asked to rank or choose
their most preferred. Responses can be used to analyze decision making, identify tradeoffs, and evaluate preferences—
tasks otherwise difﬁcult or impossible for nonmarket goods
(Hanley et al. 1998; Louviere et al. 2000; Freeman 2003).
As the angling experience is, in many instances, a nonmarket good, these methods have found frequent use in analyses
that seek to identify value and understand behavior in recreational ﬁsheries. Typically, these studies evaluate preferences and policy options by offering respondents choice
alternatives consisting of regulatory variables (e.g., size and
bag limits, seasons), catch characteristics and ﬁshery outcomes (e.g., size and number of ﬁsh caught), and, in many
cases, cost (Aas et al. 2000; Oh et al. 2005; Carter and Liese
2012; Lew and Larson 2012). Respondent decisions can be
used to quantify, for example, angler WTP for kept versus
released ﬁsh (Carter and Liese 2012), distinct values that
may be confounded using other, simpler methods.
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs), a type of statedchoice survey in which respondents are asked to select

their most preferred alternative, were used in this study.
Regulatory and nonregulatory attributes and attribute
levels for DCEs that covered a realistic range of harvest
regulations, ﬁshery outcomes, and costs were determined
in consultation with HMS Management Division staff and
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers. Given the complex regulatory nature of the ﬁshery (multiple size-classes, each
with its own harvest limits) and our interest in nonconsumptive aspects of Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing (such as hooking
and losing ﬁsh), a total of eight attributes were identiﬁed
for this study: three regulatory attributes, four catchrelated attributes, and a trip cost attribute (Table 1). Prior
to survey implementation, focus groups with HMS
Angling category permit holders were held in Hyannis,
Massachusetts, and Toms River, New Jersey, in January
and February 2016, respectively, to review draft survey
materials and provide feedback regarding attributes and
levels and the overall clarity of the questionnaire.
Discrete choice experiments frequently consist of two
multi-attribute alternatives as well as a third “opt-out” or,
in this case, “no trip” alternative (Hanley et al. 1998; Carter and Liese 2012). Respondents were asked to imagine
that they could take one of two hypothetical Blueﬁn Tuna
ﬁshing trips described or not go Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing at all,
and to select the options that they preferred most and least,
allowing for a full ranking of the three alternatives (Lew
and Larson 2012). Following Carter and Liese (2012),
DCEs also included a “derived” attribute, “Legal Harvest,”
which clariﬁed to respondents the quantity of Blueﬁn Tuna
of each size-class they were legally allowed to retain based
on the quantity and size of ﬁsh caught and stated bag limits. Additional deﬁnition boxes on the survey pages containing DCEs further clariﬁed the meaning of each
component of the choice task (Figure 1). Macros in SAS
software (SAS 9.3; SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina),
TABLE 1. Attributes and attribute levels included in DCEs presented to
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers.

Attribute
Daily bag limit: school
Daily bag limit: large
school/small medium
Annual bag limit: large
medium/giant
Catch: school
Catch: large school/small
medium
Catch: large medium/giant
Number of ﬁsh hooked
and lost
Individual trip cost

Number of levels
(values)
4 (0, 1, 2, 3)
4 (0, 1, 2, 3)
2 (0, 1)
3 (0, 1, 2)
3 (0, 1, 2)
3 (0, 1, 2)
3 (0, 1, 2)
3 ($200, $400, $600)
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FIGURE 1. Sample DCE presented to recreational U.S. East Coast Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna anglers. Since the ﬁshery is managed using English units
rather than metric units, curved fork lengths were provided in inches.

as described by Kuhfeld (2010), were used to develop an
experimental design that maximized balance and orthogonality. We utilized a fractional factorial experimental
design, in which a subset of the full factorial design (choice
sets that include all possible combinations of attribute
levels) is selected such that the effects of interest may be
efﬁciently estimated (Louviere et al. 2000). Drawing on 144
choice alternatives, our ﬁnal experimental design included
32 choice sets blocked into eight blocks of four choice sets
each, a number assumed to not be cognitively burdensome
and used in previous stated-choice studies of recreational
anglers (Carson et al. 1994; Hanley et al. 1998; Aas et al.

2000; Hicks 2002). In addition to the four DCEs, each survey included general questions to understand how angler
preferences and motivations corresponded to behavior and
values as well as to address HMS Management Division
interests. Questions were asked regarding demographics,
primary target species, Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing behavior and
experience level, and Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing and management
preferences and attitudes.
The survey research ﬁrm QuanTech, Inc. (Rockville,
Maryland), which holds a continuing agreement with
NMFS to handle conﬁdential HMS Angling permit holder
information, was responsible for survey implementation
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and data collection. A stratiﬁed random sample was drawn
from individuals who possessed an Angling category permit
as of December 31, 2015, with a listed primary port from
Maine to North Carolina (from north to south: Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
and North Carolina). Approximately 20% of Angling permit holders were selected from each state, for a total sample
size of 2,600. Within each state, selected permit holders
were randomly assigned one of the eight survey versions
(blocks), with roughly an equal number of each survey version distributed in each state. We elected to use a mail survey since response rates for mail surveys tend to be higher
than or equal to those for internet surveys (Manfreda et al.
2008; Shih and Fan 2008; Olsen 2009), and because a
mixed-mode (mail and internet) economic impact survey of
HMS Angling permit holders from Maine to North Carolina by Hutt et al. (2014) received nearly twice as many
responses via mail. Survey delivery occurred during April–
June 2016 and followed a modiﬁed Dillman approach (Dillman et al. 2009), which consisted of up to four mailings: a
prenotiﬁcation letter, initial survey package, reminder postcard, and second questionnaire. To maximize response
rates, permit holders who completed the survey were
entered into a random drawing to win one of two US$500
cash prizes, and the prenotiﬁcation mailing included a
sticker in the shape of a Blueﬁn Tuna that featured the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) logo.
Model estimation.— Stated-choice modeling is based on
random utility theory, which assumes that an individual
makes decisions in a way that integrates information
across choice alternatives in order to maximize an underlying utility function (Louviere and Timmermans 1990).
The probability of selecting a given choice alternative can
be formulated as a function of the attributes in that alternative, the attributes in the other alternatives in the choice
set, and the attributes of the individual in combination
with alternative-speciﬁc attributes (Train 2009). In the
most straightforward random utility model, the conditional logit, the probability that individual n selects alternative i can be written as
ebxni
Pni ¼ P bxnj ;
je

(1)

where x is a vector of the attributes, b is a vector of
parameters that reﬂect the utility of those attributes, and
the denominator sums over all alternatives in the choice
set, indexed here by j.
Many stated-choice studies of recreational anglers
have used an extension of the conditional logit model
known as the random parameters (or mixed) logit (e.g.,
Lew and Larson 2012), which allows for random taste

variation, correlation in unobserved factors inﬂuencing
utility (i.e., errors) across choices, and unrestricted substitution patterns (Train 2009). In these models, coefﬁcients
for parameters of interest vary across individuals, allowing researchers to investigate heterogeneity in preferences.
While the random parameters logit is a powerful tool
for identifying heterogeneity, it is less effective in explaining the sources of heterogeneity among respondents (Boxall
and Adamowicz 2002). Because a primary goal of this
study was to parse out differences among Blueﬁn Tuna
anglers that might be applicable for management purposes
(i.e., to identify discrete subpopulations of anglers) (Provencher et al. 2002), we elected to use a specialized form of
the random parameters logit known as the latent class (or
ﬁnite mixture) logit model. The underlying theory of the
latent class model is that an individual’s choice behavior is
affected not only by observable attributes present in the
choice sets but also by unobserved (or latent) preference
heterogeneity (Greene and Hensher 2003). In the latent
class model, each of the b parameters takes M possible values corresponding to M classes, or segments, in the population, with each class having its own distinct preferences.
The model jointly estimates class membership (based on
individual characteristics) and class-speciﬁc choice probabilities (based on class-speciﬁc utility parameters). In the
latent class model, the probability of individual n choosing
alternative i becomes
!
XM
ebm xni
P b x ;
Pni ¼
S
(2)
m¼1 nm
m nj
je
where bm refers to the utility parameters for each class m,
and Snm, also called the classiﬁcation function, refers to the
probability that individual n belongs to class m (Train
2009). The latent class model has been successfully used
with stated preference data to identify discrete population
classes in several environmental applications, including
wilderness park choice (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002), marine protected area preferences (Wallmo and Edwards 2008),
and freshwater recreational angler preferences (Provencher
et al. 2002; Morey et al. 2006). Such an approach requires
the researcher to hypothesize the number of discrete classes
into which the population separates (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). One notable beneﬁt of this method is that the
researcher is not forced to assume an individual’s (unknown) class membership; instead, a class probability can
be assigned for each individual (Morey et al. 2006).
Following Lew and Larson (2012), we extended the
latent class model to account for (1) the full ranking of
choice alternatives, obtained by asking respondents to
select their most and least preferred alternatives, and (2)
the panel nature of the data (each respondent answered
up to four DCEs). Using the full rank ordering of
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alternatives, as opposed to simply the most preferred alternative, increases the number of choice observations
obtained for each respondent, thereby reducing the variances of parameter estimates (Chapman and Staelin 1982).
Given that our choice sets had three options, the probability that an individual in class m chooses alternative i as
most preferred and alternative k as least preferred (Pr
[i > j > k]) corresponds to the probability of choosing
alternative i as best among the three alternatives (Pr [i| i,
j, k]) multiplied by the probability of choosing alternative
j as best among the remaining two alternatives (Pr [j| j,
k]). Given the hypothesized number of classes and the
assumption of independently and identically Gumbel-distributed random error terms, the probability of individual
n choosing alternative i is
!
XM
e km Z n
Pni ¼
PM k Z
m¼1
m n
m¼1 e



bm X i
e
ebm Xj
: (3)
ebm Xi þ ebm Xj þ ebm Xk
ebm Xj þ ebm Xk
Here, Snm has been further speciﬁed to be a function
of Zn, representing a vector of individual-speciﬁc characteristics hypothesized to affect class membership, and km,
the vector of parameters corresponding to those individual traits, with parameters for one class set to a value of
0 as the base case (modiﬁed from Boxall and Adamowicz
2002). Assuming independence of choices (and error
terms) across the choice sets, the probability that a person makes a given sequence of choices across multiple
choice sets becomes the product of individual choice
probabilities for that sequence, resulting in the following
log-likelihood:
!
XN
XM
ekm Zn
lnL¼ n¼1 ln
PM k Z
m¼1
m n
m¼1 e
Y 

 !
bm Xit
T
e
ebm Xjt
;
t¼1
ebm Xit þebm Xjt þebm Xkt
ebm Xjt þ ebm Xkt
(4)
where t represents each of up to four choice sets answered
by each respondent.
The utility of a given trip alternative (and thus the
probability of selecting that trip) for members of a given
class was assumed to be a linear function of the 11 attributes that characterized each trip, while an alternative-speciﬁc constant (ASC) was used to represent the utility of
not going Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing (option C), as has been
done in previous choice experiments for recreational ﬁsheries (e.g., Carter and Liese 2012; Dufﬁeld et al. 2012;
Lew and Larson 2012). The probability of class membership, meanwhile, was assumed to be a function of

685

individual-speciﬁc variables, including those relating to
ﬁshing behavior (e.g, avidity, target species), attitudes
(e.g., consumptive orientation), and demographics (e.g.,
region, income).
Model ﬁt for varying numbers of classes (1 [conditional
logit], 2, 3, 4, and 5) and differing vectors of individual
parameters was assessed using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
following previous studies (e.g., Boxall and Adamowicz
2002; Wallmo and Edwards 2008). Hypotheses regarding
which individual parameters to include were informed by
focus group discussions and by answers to non-DCE
questions in the surveys (see Appendix). One hundred
model runs were conducted for each model using the
high-performance computing cluster at VIMS to ensure
model convergence, which was assessed by the stability of
the model’s negative log-likelihood over model runs. The
AIC and BIC were also used to compare latent class
model ﬁt with the standard conditional logit model. All
model estimation was performed using the nonlinear minimization function (nlm) in the statistical programming
software R (R Core Team 2016).
Model analysis.— Following the selection of the ﬁnal
model and the identiﬁcation of discrete classes, the probability of an individual’s membership in each class was calculated based on the classiﬁcation function. This prior
probability was then adjusted to account for the sequence
of choices actually made by that individual, resulting in a
posterior probability of class membership (see Greene
2008). To estimate the marginal effect of individual characteristics on the posterior probability of class membership for each individual n, the log-odds of membership in
class m were regressed against the vector of individual
characteristics Z (Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Boxall and
Adamowicz 1999):


Pnm
ln
(5)
¼ bm Zn þ enm ; m ¼ 1; . . .; M:
1  Pnm
The marginal effect of each variable on class membership was then calculated by estimating the class membership probability for dummy variable values of 0 and 1 (all
individual factors in Zn were included as dummy variables) while holding other variables constant at the overall
respondent average. Additionally, we assigned individuals
to a class based on their highest posterior class probability
(Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Boxall and Adamowicz 1999)
and then used a combination of Student’s t-tests (for continuous, normally distributed data), permutation tests (for
heavily skewed data), and Fisher exact tests (for categorical data) to test for signiﬁcant differences in individualspeciﬁc variables among classes.
Willingness to pay refers to the monetary compensation needed by an individual so that utility remains
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unchanged when a choice attribute level is changed. To
calculate WTP for each class m for various aspects of a
Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing trip, the parameter corresponding to
the attribute of interest a was divided by the negative of
the cost parameter c:
WTPma ¼ 

bma
; m ¼ 1; . . .; M:
bmc

(6)

To calculate several measures of angler welfare and
preferences, including marginal effects of attribute changes
on trip probability, compensating surplus of regulatory
changes, and consumer surplus, it was necessary to estimate attribute levels for an “average” recreational Blueﬁn
Tuna ﬁshing trip on the U.S. East Coast during 2015 (the
most recent complete ﬁshing year prior to survey delivery)
(Table 2). Estimates of the numbers of school, large
school, and small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna harvested
and released, as well as the number of large medium and
giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna released, from Maine to Virginia
during June–October 2015 were obtained through an
online LPS query (NMFS Fisheries Statistics Division,
personal communication). An estimate of the number of
large medium and giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna retained by
Angling category permit holders from Maine to Virginia
during 2015 (not available through an LPS query) was
obtained through a data request to the HMS Management
Division (S. McLaughlin, NMFS, personal communication). Total Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing effort by private anglers
from Maine to Virginia during June–October 2015,
obtained through an LPS data request, was estimated to
be 16,367 vessel trips (R. Kitts-Jensen, NMFS, personal
communication); harvest and release estimates for the different Blueﬁn Tuna size-classes were divided by the effort
estimate to calculate per-trip values. Because the LPS only
occurs for 6 months out of the year and does not include
North Carolina, average catch and effort values used here
do not fully capture the U.S. East Coast Blueﬁn Tuna
ﬁshery but constitute the best available data and were
deemed adequate for estimating catch and effort on the
average trip. Focus-group attendees suggested that
roughly one-third of Blueﬁn Tuna hooked are lost before
being caught, an estimate used to derive the average number of ﬁsh hooked and lost per trip. Lastly, we used Hutt
et al.’s (2014) estimate of per Angling permit holder trip
expenditures for HMS Angling category permit holders
targeting Atlantic tunas in 2011 from Maine to North
Carolina ($534) as an average Blueﬁn Tuna trip expenditure value.
Class-speciﬁc WTP for the average trip was calculated
by taking the sum of the products of 2015 average attribute levels X (excluding cost) and their corresponding
parameters b, subtracting the value of the ASC, and dividing by the negative of the cost parameter:

TABLE 2. Attribute levels for the “average” 2015 recreational Blueﬁn
Tuna trip taken along the U.S. East Coast. Note: while some large
medium/giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna were undoubtedly released by recreational anglers during 2015, the large pelagics survey (LPS) did not
intercept any anglers who did so (which is not surprising given that
such an event is relatively rare). As a result, while recognizing that
this estimate is lower than the actual value, we included the LPS estimate of 0 here.

Blueﬁn Tuna trip characteristics
Daily bag limit: school
Daily bag limit: large school/small medium
Annual bag limit: large medium/giant
Released: school
Released: large school/small medium
Released: large medium/giant
Harvested: school
Harvested: large school/small medium
Harvested: large medium/giant
Number of ﬁsh hooked and lost
Individual trip cost

P
WTPm2015 ¼ 

A
a¼1

bma X2015  bmNoTrip
bmc

2015 average
trip
2
1
1
0.07
0.07
0
0.06
0.06
0.001
0.06
$534

; m ¼ 1; . . .; M:
(7)

A weighted average WTP for the entire sample was estimated by summing the product of class-speciﬁc WTP and the
probability of class membership across all classes (Domanski
and Haefen 2010). In addition, the marginal effect of each
trip attribute on the class-speciﬁc probability of taking a
Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing trip was determined by calculating each
class’s logit probability while holding attributes at the 2015
average levels but varying the attribute level of interest from
0 to 1 (with the exception of cost, which was changed by
$100); the difference in probabilities then represented the
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in attribute a.
To determine the effect of possible management
changes on the welfare of private recreational Blueﬁn
Tuna anglers, we estimated class-speciﬁc compensating
surplus under relevant plausible regulatory scenarios
(Hanemann 1984; Hoyos 2010):
Compensating surplusm
X
i
1 h X bma X1
¼
ln
e
 ln
ebma X0 ;
bmc

(8)

where X0 and X1 represent the vector of trip attributes at
the status quo (2015 average trip) and after management
changes, respectively. Welfare impacts were examined for
the following management changes: no harvest of large
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medium or giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna; no harvest of any
Blueﬁn Tuna; and complete closure of the ﬁshery (i.e., no
permitted targeting of Blueﬁn Tuna).
Consumer surplus for each class for 2015 was estimated
by multiplying class-speciﬁc consumer surplus per trip by
the estimated number of Blueﬁn Tuna trips taken by that
class in 2015. The estimated number of trips for members
of each class was calculated by multiplying the total number of Blueﬁn Tuna trips taken in 2015 by the proportion
of all active Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshers who were posteriorly
assigned to that class (i.e., respondents who indicated having targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the previous 5 years). Summing these class-speciﬁc estimates provided a consumer
surplus estimate for the private recreational Blueﬁn Tuna
ﬁshery as a whole:
Consumer surplus2015
XM
¼
½ðPmActive  TotalTrips2015 Þ
m¼1
ðWTPm2015  TripCost2015 Þ:

(9)

Conﬁdence intervals (95%) for welfare measures (WTP,
compensating surplus, and consumer surplus) and marginal
effects were generated using the resampling method suggested by Krinsky and Robb (1986), based on 10,000 random draws of class-speciﬁc vectors of utility parameters
from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean and
covariance matrix set to model estimates. Each draw was
used to calculate one estimate for the measure of interest
(welfare or marginal effect); following all calculations, the
distribution for that measure was evaluated. This approach
to calculating the distribution of welfare impacts has been
used previously with logit models in an environmental valuation context (see Park et al. 1991; Domanski and Haefen
2010; Hoyos 2010; Haab et al. 2012).

RESULTS
Response Rates and Non-DCE Findings
Of the 2,485 eligible respondents in the sample frame,
1,154 (46.4%) returned the survey having answered at least
one question, while 980 (39.4%) completed at least one
DCE (Table 3). The proportion of respondents from each
state who completed at least one DCE did not differ signiﬁcantly from the proportion of the total sample from
each state (P > 0.05), suggesting a lack of geographic
response bias. Preliminary analysis of non-DCE survey
questions suggested regional segmentation and led to the
inclusion of regional dummy variables in modeling efforts,
along with other demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral
variables (see Appendix for a summary of responses to
non-DCE questions).
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The Latent Class Model
Final model speciﬁcation.— While latent class models
with two, three, four, and ﬁve classes were attempted, convergence was only achieved for the two-class, 31-parameter model (Table 4): 20 of 100 model runs had a
negative log-likelihood of between 4,857 and 4,858, while
all models with larger class structures failed to converge
to a stable negative log-likelihood. The three-class model,
while not fully converging, appeared to separate one of
the two classes in the two-class model into two separate
classes rather than identifying three novel classes, lending
support to the two-class model. Model selection criteria
indicated that the two-class model provided a markedly
better ﬁt to the data than did the conditional logit model
(ΔAIC = 1,728.9).
Parameter estimates for the ﬁnal two-class model are
listed in Table 5. Of the two-class models tested (each
with differing individual-speciﬁc variables to inform class
membership), the best-ﬁtting model included the 12 alternative-speciﬁc attributes and six individual-speciﬁc
dummy variables. Consumptive and nonconsumptive orientation dummy variables were generated based on
respondents’ answers to two ﬁve-point Likert scale questions included in the non-DCE portion of the survey.
Respondents who selected “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”
for each of the following two statements were considered
consumptively oriented: “I would never target Blueﬁn
Tuna if I were not allowed to retain ﬁsh” and “Generally speaking, I would be more satisﬁed with a Blueﬁn
Tuna ﬁshing trip if I were able to bring more ﬁsh back
to the dock (e.g., I am more satisﬁed with a trip on
which I retain three Blueﬁn Tuna than a trip on which I
retain two Blueﬁn Tuna).” Respondents who selected
“Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” for each of these
statements were considered nonconsumptively oriented.
Dummy variables were also used to identify individuals
with primary ports in either New England or New
York/New Jersey, those who had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna
in the previous 5 years, and those with an annual
income of over $150,000. The median annual income for
respondents was between $100,000 and $150,000, with
nearly 40% of respondents indicating annual income
greater than $150,000 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Latent class probabilities were 0.53 and 0.47 for class 1
and class 2, respectively. Of anglers posteriorly assigned
to class 1 (posterior probability > 0.5), 96.4% were
assigned with >80% probability (91.8% with >90% probability), and 97.1% of anglers posteriorly assigned to
class 2 were assigned with >80% probability (94.3% with
>90% probability).
As expected, coefﬁcients for harvest were positive and
signiﬁcant for both classes, and coefﬁcients for cost were
negative. The classes differed notably, however, in the
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TABLE 3. Sample frame and responses by state.

State

Permit holders

Maine
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
Total

Eligible respondents

Number of responses

Response rate (%)

425
186
2,470
539
574
1,822
2,713
750
1,044
908
1,314

82
38
483
107
115
327
538
149
208
180
258

40
8
188
41
56
110
224
69
72
71
101

48.8
21.1
38.9
38.3
48.7
33.6
41.6
46.3
34.6
39.4
39.1

12,745

2,485

980

39.4

TABLE 4. Models ﬁtted to angler DCE responses; CL refers to conditional logit, LCM refers to latent class model, and DNC indicates that a model
failed to converge to a stable negative log-likelihood.

Model
CL
Two-class LCM
LCM with > two classes

Number of parameters

Log-likelihood

AIC

BIC

12
31
31 + 19 9 M

5,740.48
4,857.03
DNC

11,504.96
9,776.06
DNC

11,579.75
9,927.58
DNC

effect of the catch on utility. Because the model included
both a catch variable and a harvest variable for each Blueﬁn Tuna size-class, catch parameters might be considered
to represent the utility of catching and releasing a Blueﬁn
Tuna (i.e., the model parameter identiﬁed the effect of an
increase in catch independent of changes in harvest).
Catch and release of Blueﬁn Tuna generally increased utility (and thus probability of trip choice) for class 1, but
had the opposite effect on class 2 for large school/small
medium and large medium/giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna. In
addition, the no-trip ASC for class 1 was negative and signiﬁcant, indicating a preference for Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing
regardless of trip characteristics. This result reﬂects the
fact that all 523 respondents assigned to class 1 selected
the no-trip option as their least-preferred option for at
least one DCE, compared with only 24.3% of class 2
respondents. These differences resulted in a signiﬁcantly
higher probability of taking a Blueﬁn Tuna trip at average
2015 levels for class 1 (0.95) than for class 2 (0.27) and in
varying (often opposite) marginal effects of attribute
changes on trip probability—that is, how a marginal
change in a trip attribute (e,g., increasing school-size Blueﬁn Tuna harvest from 0 to 1) would change the probability of an individual taking a Blueﬁn Tuna trip given their
class membership (Table 6).
Latent class characterization.— Income and Blueﬁn
Tuna targeting were the only two individual-speciﬁc variables to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence class membership (Table 5).

The multiple linear regression on the log-odds of class
membership as a function of the individual-speciﬁc parameters revealed that individuals who had an annual income
of over $150,000 and who had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in
the past 5 years were signiﬁcantly more likely to be in
class 1 (Table 7); an individual possessing both of these
characteristics was 71.4% more likely to be in class 1. The
increase in class 1 probability due to both having high
income and having recently targeted Blueﬁn Tuna is not
simply the sum of the increases in class 1 probability for
each characteristic because the two are weakly correlated
(Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient [rs] was 0.07).
Fisher exact tests indicated that a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of individuals posteriorly assigned to class 1 had
targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the past 5 years and had an
annual income of over $150,000 compared with those in
class 2, while New England or New York/New Jersey residency and consumptive orientation were not signiﬁcantly
different between classes (Table A.2). Interestingly, a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of permit holders posteriorly
assigned to class 2 were from mid-Atlantic states, possibly
due to the reduced proportion of mid-Atlantic permit
holders who had recently targeted Blueﬁn Tuna compared
with anglers from other regions (see Table A.1).
Angler Welfare
The WTP values show striking differences in preferences among the two classes (Table 8). Class 1 members
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TABLE 5. Parameter estimates for two-class latent class logit model ﬁt
to DCE data. A single asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at P = 0.05; a
double asterisk (**) denotes signiﬁcance at P = 0.01. LS/SM = large
school/small medium, LM/G = large medium/giant.

Class 1
Variables

b

Class 2
SE

X variables
Daily bag: S
0.292** 0.080
Daily bag:
0.208** 0.065
LS/SM
Annual bag:
0.518** 0.119
LM/G
Catch: S
0.230** 0.078
Catch: LS/SM
0.197** 0.071
Catch: LM/G
0.122* 0.058
Legal harvest: S
0.296** 0.107
Legal harvest:
0.621** 0.087
LS/SM
Legal harvest:
0.581** 0.129
LM/G
Hooked and lost
0.219** 0.040
Trip cost
0.002** 0.0003
No-trip ASC
2.647** 0.271
Z variables
Consumptive
0
Nonconsumptive
0
High income
0
New England
0
New York/New
0
Jersey
Target Blueﬁn
0
Tuna
Intercept
0
Latent class
0.528
probability

b

SE

0.0950
0.051

0.058
0.053

0.140

0.095

0.092
0.202**
0.121*
0.342**
0.754**

0.059
0.059
0.048
0.078
0.077

TABLE 6. Marginal effects of a one-unit change in trip attribute levels
on trip probability, given 2015 average Blueﬁn Tuna trip levels; S refers
to school-size ﬁsh LS/SM refers to large school/small medium-size ﬁsh,
LM/G refers to large medium/giant-size ﬁsh, and CR refers to catch and
release. A single asterisk (*) denotes a marginal probability statistically
signiﬁcant at a 95% conﬁdence level based on 10,000 draws of the
parameter vector; bold text denotes a signiﬁcant difference in marginal
probability between classes.

Factor
2015 average trip probability
Marginal effects
CR, 1 S
CR, 1 LS/SM
CR, 1 LM/G
Harvest, 1 S
Harvest, 1 LS/SM
Harvest, 1 LM/G
Hook and lose 1 ﬁsh
$100 increase in trip cost

Class 1

Class 2

0.955*

0.266*

0.009*
0.008*
0.005*
0.019*
0.026*
0.023*
0.009*
0.009*

0.018
0.037*
0.023*
0.092*
0.118*
0.103*
0.011
0.039*

0.602** 0.110
0.056
0.036
0.002** 0.0002
0.223
0.186
0.014
0.195
0.363*
0.086
0.131

0.203
0.208
0.147
0.178
0.175

0.964** 0.195
0.783** 0.154
0.472

exhibited positive WTP for catching and releasing Blueﬁn
Tuna of all size-classes, while class 2 members were indifferent to catching and releasing school-size ﬁsh and actually indicated a negative WTP for catching and releasing
larger size-classes, meaning that these individuals lose utility by practicing catch-and-release ﬁshing (and would have
to be paid in order to do so). Class 1 members exhibited a
WTP of $1,438 for the no-trip ASC—in other words,
these individuals would have to be paid over $1,400 to
not go on a Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing trip—indicating the value
placed on simply going Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing, regardless of
trip outcomes. For class 2 members, however, WTP for
the no-trip ASC was not different from 0, indicating their
indifference to a Blueﬁn Tuna trip independent of trip
attributes (namely, harvest). Despite these contrasts in
nonconsumptive preferences, WTP for harvest did not

TABLE 7. Output of multiple linear regression of the log-odds of posterior class 2 membership as a function of Z parameters. A single asterisk
(*) denotes signiﬁcance at P = 0.05; a double asterisk (**) denotes
signiﬁcance at P = 0.01. Adjusted R2 = 0.1116. F-statistic = 21.5 (P =
2.2 9 1016).

Variable
Intercept
Consumptive
Nonconsumptive
High income
New England
New York/New Jersey
Target Blueﬁn Tuna

Estimate
6.9088**
0.1075
0.3626
1.7015**
0.1963
0.5864
5.7609**

Marginal effect of
class 2 probability

0.218
0.446

vary signiﬁcantly between classes—that is, 95% CIs associated with WTP for harvest of each Blueﬁn Tuna size-class
overlapped between the two classes. For the average 2015
trip WTP differed signiﬁcantly between class 1 ($2,218.72)
and class 2 ($49.90), with an overall weighted average
WTP of $1,285.11 (Figure 2). Interestingly, for class 2
members, who were signiﬁcantly less likely to have taken
a Blueﬁn Tuna trip in the previous 5 years, WTP for the
average 2015 trip ($49.90) was much less than the average
estimated cost per Angling permit holder for a 2015 Blueﬁn Tuna trip ($534); this can be attributed to the low harvest levels associated with the average trip in 2015.
Consumer surplus for the 2015 recreational Blueﬁn Tuna
ﬁshery as a whole, weighted by class (based on survey
responses, 61.8% of active Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshers were estimated to be in class 1 and 38.2% in class 2), was estimated
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TABLE 8. Class-speciﬁc WTP for Blueﬁn Tuna trip attributes. A single
asterisk (*) denotes a WTP signiﬁcantly different from 0 at a 95% conﬁdence level based on 10,000 draws of the parameter vector; bold text
denotes a signiﬁcant difference in WTP between classes. LS/SM = large
school/small medium, LM/G = large medium/giant.

Attribute
Catch: S
Catch: LS/SM
Catch: LM/G
Legal harvest: S
Legal harvest: LS/SM
Legal harvest: LM/G
Hook and lose
No trip (option C)

Class 1

Class 2

$123.09*
$104.52*
$64.71*
$160.20*
$338.46*
$315.33*
$118.89*
–$1,438.35*

$44.11
–$97.04*
–$58.64*
$162.98*
$360.01*
$288.58*
$26.71
$111.50

to be $14.01 million (SD = $3.99 million), reﬂecting the difference between aggregate WTP for 16,367 average 2015
Blueﬁn Tuna vessel trips ($22.75 million) and aggregate estimated 2015 Blueﬁn Tuna trip expenditures ($8.74 million).
Using Angling category landings for Blueﬁn Tuna in 2015
(113.1 metric tons; HMS Management Division, unpublished data) and the estimated proportion of landings taken
by Angling category permit holders (69.4%) as opposed to
HMS Charter/Headboat permit holders (NMFS, Fisheries
Statistics Division, personal communication), private-angler
Blueﬁn Tuna landings in 2015 were estimated to be 78.5
metric tons, resulting in a consumer surplus of $80.98 per
pound ($178.16/kg) of harvest. This high marginal WTP for
harvest reﬂects the fact that for class 1 anglers, who represent over half of active Blueﬁn Tuna anglers, signiﬁcant surplus is derived not just from harvest but from the
nonconsumptive aspects of Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing as well.
Class-speciﬁc estimates of angler-compensating surplus
largely reﬂect the stark difference in preferences between
classes (Table 9). For example, a complete ﬁshery closure
would result in a loss of over $1,700 in welfare per trip
for class 1 anglers, a result of the signiﬁcant beneﬁts that
class 1 anglers derive from the ﬁshery from aspects other
than harvest (whose 2015 levels were relatively low). However, for class 2 anglers, a ﬁshery closure would only generate a per-trip welfare loss of about $150 given the
already low harvest levels (and thus low class 2 WTP)
associated with the 2015 average trip.

DISCUSSION
Drivers of Class Membership
Our results clearly demonstrate a segmentation in preferences among Blueﬁn Tuna anglers along the U.S. East
Coast, indicating substantial heterogeneity in derived welfare among anglers while also providing key insights into

FIGURE 2. Willingness to pay (WTP) for the average 2015 Blueﬁn
Tuna trip by class and overall. Diamonds represent the mean values and
vertical dashed lines indicate the 95% Krinsky–Robb CIs based on
10,000 random draws.

how changes to regulations and ﬁshery conditions (e.g.,
costs, ﬁsh distribution) could impact effort and harvest.
Preference heterogeneity appears to largely be driven by
income and recent (within the past 5 years) targeting of
Blueﬁn Tuna (or lack thereof), both of which are logical
in the context of the ﬁshery. Regulations governing recreational Blueﬁn Tuna harvest have generally been strict
since the mid-2000s, only allowing one to three ﬁsh per
vessel per day (NOAA 2012, 2014a); as a result, individuals who highly value harvest but not catch-and-release
ﬁshing (i.e., class 2 members) have perhaps not been compelled to target Blueﬁn Tuna in recent years—as evidenced
by the 0.27 probability of taking a trip with 2015 average
trip levels for class 2 members (see Table 6). This idea
was reinforced during presurvey focus groups, when some
anglers mentioned targeting Blueﬁn Tuna heavily when
regulations were liberal in the early 2000s (e.g., in 2003,
when vessels could retain one school, large school, or
small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna per person, or up to six
per vessel, per day [NOAA 2003]), but subsequently
switching to other species with less restrictive harvest limits when Blueﬁn Tuna bag limits were reduced. For lowerincome anglers, meanwhile, it may not be feasible or
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TABLE 9. Class-speciﬁc compensating surplus (base case: 2015 levels).
A single asterisk (*) denotes compensating surplus signiﬁcantly different
from 0 at a 95% conﬁdence level based on 10,000 draws of the parameter
vector; bold text denotes a signiﬁcant difference in compensating surplus
between classes.

Change from 2015 ﬁshery
No LM–G harvest
Catch-and-release ﬁshing only
Fishery closure

Class 1

Class 2

$268.00*
$675.76*
$1,708.90*

$17.09
$38.32
$149.14*

worthwhile to target Blueﬁn Tuna with any regularity (or
at all) given the high costs of the ﬁshery coupled with relatively restrictive harvest regulations. Among lower-income
anglers (annual income < $150,000) who had not targeted
Blueﬁn Tuna in the previous 5 years, 34% indicated the
high expense of Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing as a reason for not
recently targeting the species, compared with only 20% for
high-income anglers (P = 0.08).
The ﬁnding that anglers with higher levels of income
value catch-and-release ﬁshing more highly is supported
by previous studies of U.S. recreational anglers. In a survey of freshwater anglers in New York State, Connelly
et al. (2001) used cluster analysis to identify seven types of
anglers; a highly skilled group that targeted coldwater species and practiced catch and release had the highest average income of the seven groups. Grambsch and Fisher
(1991) found that freshwater black bass anglers with an
annual income greater than the U.S. median were signiﬁcantly more likely to practice catch and release than
anglers with incomes below the median. Most notably, in
a study of billﬁsh tournament anglers along the U.S.
Atlantic and Gulf coasts as well as in Puerto Rico, Graefe
and Ditton (1997) found that income was a signiﬁcant
predictor of whether an angler would release all billﬁsh
(anglers with a higher income were more likely to release
all billﬁsh) and that income was the strongest predictor of
the number of billﬁsh kept (anglers with a lower income
kept more billﬁsh). While Blueﬁn Tuna are a more
sought-after food ﬁsh than billﬁsh, a similar association
with income and catch-and-release angling could presumably hold. In the present study, a Fisher exact test
revealed that a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of anglers
with an annual income of over $150,000 stated that they
voluntarily release Blueﬁn Tuna (59%) compared with
anglers with an annual income of less than $150,000
(42%; P = 0.03).
The relatively high value attached to catch-and-release
ﬁshing among higher-income anglers identiﬁed both in
previous studies and through some of our questions may
explain the continued avidity of this group despite increasingly restrictive Blueﬁn Tuna harvest regulations, suggesting there is a relatively inelastic response in effort to
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management strategies by class 1 anglers. Interestingly,
our model did not identify signiﬁcant differences in WTP
for harvest between class 1 and class 2—both groups considered harvest equally important. However, the additional
value attached by class 1 anglers to nonconsumptive aspects
of Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing (catch and release, hooking and losing ﬁsh, and other factors captured by the ASC) appear to
provide sufﬁcient incentive for this group to continue targeting Blueﬁn Tuna despite restrictive harvest regulations.
Studies using pop-up satellite archival tags have indicated
that postrelease mortality of Blueﬁn Tuna released in recreational ﬁsheries is low (<5%) across size-classes (Stokesbury
et al. 2011; Marcek and Graves 2014; Goldsmith et al.
2017), suggesting that catch-and-release angling is a viable
conservation strategy that would provide substantial beneﬁts, especially to high-income anglers.
For both angler classes, WTP to harvest a large school
or small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna was higher than WTP
to harvest a large medium or giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna,
although differences in WTP for harvest did not differ signiﬁcantly across size-classes for either angler class. This
counterintuitive ﬁnding (higher WTP for harvesting a
smaller ﬁsh) could be explained by the fact that in the survey, as in recent years, vessel bag limits for harvest of
school and large school and small medium-size Blueﬁn
Tuna were on a per-trip basis, whereas for large medium
and giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna, vessel bag limits were on a
per-year basis. As a result, if the annual bag limit for large
medium or giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna is one ﬁsh, choosing to
retain a large medium or giant-size Blueﬁn Tuna would
prevent harvest of similarly sized ﬁsh on future trips.
However, retaining a large school or small medium-size
Blueﬁn Tuna would present no such constraint. A preference for both angler classes to harvest larger ﬁsh is suggested by higher mean WTP for harvesting a large school
or small medium-size Blueﬁn Tuna than for a school-size
Blueﬁn Tuna, both of which have bag limits on a per-trip
basis.
The lack of explanatory power of the consumptive orientation variables included in the class membership model
is possibly because the Likert scale questions used to
deﬁne these variables were only asked to individuals who
stated that they had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the previous
5 years, the latter being a dominant determinant of class
membership. However, both the consumptive and nonconsumptive orientation dummy variables were highly correlated with having targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the previous
5 years (Spearman’s rs was 0.39 and 0.36, respectively),
and only the targeting variable was signiﬁcant in the
model, suggesting that recent Blueﬁn Tuna targeting
behavior is likely a stronger driver of class membership.
There are, however, two possible alternative reasons for
the lack of signiﬁcance of the consumptive orientation factors: (1) the Likert scale questions used to deﬁne
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consumptive orientation may not have adequately captured angler attitudes; and/or (2) the stated consumptive
attitudes of anglers (in Likert scale questions) may not
have aligned with the preferences expressed in DCE
responses. This latter possibility highlights a key strength
of using DCEs for eliciting preferences; for example, a
respondent may not consider himself consumptively oriented when directly asked (resulting in nonconsumptive
responses to Likert scale questions), but when confronted
with actual trip scenarios, may in fact select trip alternatives that allow greater opportunities for harvest.
WTP Comparisons with Previous Studies
Our class-speciﬁc WTP estimates for harvest of a single
Blueﬁn Tuna, which ranged from $160.20 to $360.01
across size ranges and angler classes, are generally higher
than the marginal WTP for catch of an additional ﬁsh
found in Johnston et al.’s (2006) meta-analysis of recreational ﬁshing values obtained for diverse ﬁsheries using
various analytical methods (391 observations from 48
studies between 1977 and 2001), which found WTPs ranging from $0.048 to $612.79, with a mean of $16.82. Species in the meta-analysis with higher WTPs (>$100/ﬁsh)
generally included popular food and sport ﬁsh such as salmon (e.g., Jones and Stokes Associates 1987; Morey et al.
1993) and big-game species such as billﬁsh and sharks
(e.g., Schuhmann 1996 reviewed in Johnston et al. 2006).
In addition, our estimates are similar to Dufﬁeld et al.’s
(2012) WTP estimate of $276.44 for catching a Blue Marlin Makaira nigricans among private-boat Hawaiian
anglers (the survey did not distinguish between harvested
and released ﬁsh). Given their elite status as both a food
and sport ﬁsh, the high WTP estimated for Blueﬁn Tuna
harvest is not surprising.
Class 1 WTPs for Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshing trip characteristics were found to be generally similar to values for other
sport ﬁsh for which signiﬁcant nonharvest beneﬁts are
derived. For example, Dufﬁeld et al. (2012) also found
that Hawaiian anglers were willing to pay $166.45 to see
a Blue Marlin and $128.72 to hook and lose a Blue Marlin—60% and 47% of WTP for catch, respectively. The
importance of these nonconsumptive aspects, in terms of
both WTP and relative importance compared with catch,
is similar to class 1 members in the present study, who
demonstrated a WTP of $118.89 for hooking and losing a
Blueﬁn Tuna—35–74% of WTP for Blueﬁn Tuna harvest,
depending on size-class. Similarly, in their discrete choice
survey of southeastern U.S. anglers, Carter and Liese
(2012) found WTP for releasing an additional King Mackerel Scomberomorus cavalla due to having reached the bag
limit ($37.62) to be nearly half the WTP for King Mackerel harvest ($77.59), although this reﬂects marginal WTP
for the second ﬁsh caught rather than the ﬁrst ﬁsh and
thus is a conservative estimate. While the WTP values for

Blueﬁn Tuna are higher, the relative proportion of WTP
for catch-and-release ﬁshing compared with harvest (21–
77%, depending on size-class) for class 1 is similar to that
shown for King Mackerel. Thus, for class 1 anglers, Blueﬁn Tuna, in addition to being a highly desirable food ﬁsh,
are also a valuable game ﬁsh that, like Blue Marlin and
King Mackerel, can provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts even in
the absence of catch and/or harvest.
For class 2 members, harvest is the primary factor driving choice, and preference for harvest (and aversion to
practicing catch and release) is even stronger than in other
studies for coveted food ﬁsh. In the same study that found
relatively high WTP for King Mackerel release compared
with harvest, Carter and Liese (2012) calculated a WTP
for harvesting Red Snapper Lutjanus campechanus and
grouper species ($80.40 and $62.97, respectively) more
than eight times the value of releasing the ﬁsh due to bag
limit restrictions ($9.95 and $6.86, respectively). While
both Red Snapper and groupers are considered highly
desirable food species, anglers still placed some value on
catch-and-release ﬁshing, compared with the negative
WTP values exhibited by class 2 Blueﬁn Tuna anglers in
the present study.
Applications to Management
We found that the recreational Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshery
resulted in an aggregate consumer surplus of over $14 million for 2015. This estimate reﬂects the total net beneﬁts
that anglers derived above and beyond trip expenditures—
a recreational analog to proﬁt obtained by a commercial
ﬁshery. Because this consumer surplus estimate does not
include clients on charter ﬁshing vessels targeting Blueﬁn
Tuna (who presumably derive beneﬁts exceeding charter
costs) and only includes effort captured by the LPS, which
does not fully cover the ﬁshery’s spatial and temporal
range, it is likely conservatively low. Aggregate consumer
surplus estimates for recreational ﬁsheries are generally
scarce in the literature due to the lack of available expenditure and valuation information. It is worth noting that
our estimate does carry signiﬁcant caveats: for example,
(1) the assumption that Blueﬁn Tuna trips in 2015 cost
roughly the same as all tuna trips (Blueﬁn Tuna and other
species) along the U.S. East Coast in 2011, and (2) the
fact that the relative proportion of anglers in each class
who had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the past 5 years is
equivalent to the relative proportion of Blueﬁn Tuna trips
taken by members of each class in 2015. Nevertheless, our
estimate provides a reasonable starting point for comparison with previous research as well as consideration of
allocation questions within the U.S. Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshery.
Using responses from a contingent valuation survey of
recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers (both private and charter) in Hatteras, North Carolina, Stoll and Ditton (2006)
estimated an individual annual consumer surplus of $344
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for maintaining the quality of the Blueﬁn Tuna ﬁshery
with the regulations in place at the time; because anglers
averaged 0.97 trips per year, this value essentially
amounted to a per-trip consumer surplus. While this value
is quite different from the consumer surplus estimates generated for each class in the present study ($1,684.72 and
$484.10 for class 1 and class 2, respectively), it does fall
in between the two values and raises the possibility that
the median estimate of $344 may represent an aggregation
of substantial heterogeneity in preferences among Blueﬁn
Tuna anglers such as those identiﬁed here.
Perhaps of greater policy relevance than aggregate consumer surplus in the ﬁshery is the marginal consumer surplus, estimated to be $80.98 per pound of harvested
Blueﬁn Tuna. When considering the allocation of a ﬁshery’s quota among competing sectors—for example, commercial and recreational—resource economists have
generally relied on some version of the equimarginal principle, which dictates that an efﬁcient allocation of the
resource occurs when the marginal net beneﬁt of additional quota is equal among sectors. In 2015, commercial
ex-vessel prices (revenue) of Blueﬁn Tuna landed in the
United States ranged from $5.75 to $7.27/lb ($12.65–
$15.99/kg) (NMFS 2017), meaning that marginal proﬁt
was even lower (ex-vessel price minus expenses). Based on
the equimarginal principle alone, it would appear economically efﬁcient to increase the Angling category share of
the U.S. Blueﬁn Tuna quota. However, it is important to
remember that since the probability of Class 1 anglers taking a trip was 0.96, given 2015 average values, additional
effort resulting from increased stock abundance (catchability), angling category allocation and/or liberalized regulations would likely come from the more consumptively
oriented class 2 (whose probability of taking a trip, given
2015 average values, was only 0.27). Because class 2 consumer surplus for the average 2015 trip was $484.10,
substantial increases in harvest (and thus allocation)
would be needed to result in a positive marginal consumer
surplus for class 2, while class 1 effort (and surplus) likely
would not change markedly with higher harvest levels,
though there would be some increase due to class 1’s positive WTP for harvest. As a result, increasing allocation
levels to the recreational Angling category may not signiﬁcantly improve the efﬁciency of the U.S. Blueﬁn Tuna
ﬁshery as a whole.
While the model was effective at explaining the sources
of heterogeneity among recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers,
those sources—income and recent Blueﬁn Tuna targeting
—do not initially appear to be as salient to management
as, for example, regional heterogeneity. However, what
our results do show is a large amount of latent, or potential, effort in the ﬁshery: the class 2 anglers who have not
targeted Blueﬁn Tuna recently, but who could plausibly
reenter the ﬁshery if conditions—ﬁsh availability,
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regulations, and costs—made it a worthwhile endeavor.
The availability of and regulations for alternative target
species, which were found to be diverse and region-speciﬁc
among respondents, could also play a signiﬁcant role in
determining whether class 2 anglers decide to target Blueﬁn Tuna; for future studies, especially those on a smaller
geographic scale, it may be practical to consider these species tradeoffs among anglers. With the most recent Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna stock assessment indicating that the
species is no longer experiencing overﬁshing (ICCAT
2017), managers should be wary that even a small increase
in daily Blueﬁn Tuna bag limits could result in a large
and sudden increase in participation and harvest. Their
consideration of the utility function of class 2 anglers (and
thus the “tipping point” at which inactive anglers could
reenter the ﬁshery) could inform the degree to which regulations should be liberalized in order to maintain landings
within the designated subquota.
Our application of a latent class logit model to decisions made by recreational Blueﬁn Tuna anglers revealed
distinct heterogeneity in preferences among anglers, with
important implications for management. The use of latent
class models, as opposed to more conventional randomparameters models, could prove useful in other recreational ﬁshery scenarios where class-speciﬁc management
—for example, regionally or by gear type—is a feasible
strategy. Our results could also help inform, through the
estimation of compensating surplus, the comparative welfare impact of management alternatives that would meet
similar biological goals (though models and assumptions
regarding catch, harvest, and other conditions such as
resource access would be required; see Holzer and
McConnell 2014). By doing so, managers could best maximize the welfare of these user groups while maintaining
ﬁshing mortality within biologically acceptable limits.
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Appendix: Responses to Non-DCE Survey Questions
Examination of non-DCE survey questions provided
an initial framework for exploring angler attitudes and
preferences to test in choice modeling efforts (Table A.1).
For example, there appeared to be strong segmentation by
region, with anglers from New England coastal states
(n = 333) exhibiting distinct angling behaviors and
preferences compared with those from the New York/New
Jersey (n = 334) or mid-Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina; n = 313) regions. New
England anglers generally had higher incomes, targeted
Blueﬁn Tuna more frequently (both in terms of trips per
season and having targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in recent years),
were less consumptively oriented, and targeted Blueﬁn
Tuna closer to port than anglers from other regions. This

apparent heterogeneity was used to inform individualspeciﬁc Z variables to incorporate into the latent class
model. While attitudes regarding the importance of
harvest showed a high degree of variation among
respondents, anglers appeared broadly willing to accept
some degree of reduction in harvest if it meant increased
ﬁshery quality in future years: 78.3% of respondents
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “I would be
willing to accept a lower daily Blueﬁn Tuna bag limit if
doing so would help further rebuild Blueﬁn Tuna stocks
and allow for greater future ﬁshing opportunities.” At the
same time, however, a majority of anglers (59.3%) agreed
or strongly agreed that they would never target Blueﬁn
Tuna if they were not allowed to harvest ﬁsh.

TABLE A.1. Responses to non-DCE questions used to inform latent class choice modeling. Different lowercase letters indicate regional values that
are signiﬁcantly different from one another (P = 0.05). Only respondents who previously stated that they had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the last 5 years
answered the question indicating how many trips they took in 2015 that targeted Blueﬁn Tuna.

Variable

Description (sample size)

Value

New
England

Age
Income

Mean age in years (1,129)
% with annual
income > $150,000 (965)
Mean in years (1,111)
% who have targeted
Blueﬁn Tuna in last
5 years (1,143)
Mean in number of trips
(711)
% who ﬁshed for Blueﬁn
Tuna < 25 miles from
port (686)
% who ever voluntarily
released Blueﬁn Tuna
(683)
% with consumptive
orientation (670)
% who prefer short, highharvest season (685)

56
37.8%

41.9% z

41.3%

30.4% y

14.7
61.9%

76% z

66.1% z

43.5% y

3.12

4.2 z

2.6 y

2.1 y

30.8%

54.4% z

10.9% y

19.7% y

39.3%

21.6% z

57.3% y

41.6% y

38.8%

22% z

53% y

46.8% y

Years targeting HMS
Blueﬁn Tuna targeting

2015 trips targeting Blueﬁn Tuna
Distance from port ﬁshed

Voluntarily release Blueﬁn Tuna

Consumptive orientation
Season length preference

New York/
New Jersey

Mid-Atlantic

51.4%
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TABLE A.2. Percent (%) of individuals in each class (absolute class assignment) who exhibit speciﬁc individual characteristics. A single asterisk (*)
denotes a signiﬁcant difference in percentage between classes at P = 0.05; a double asterisk (**) denotes signiﬁcance at P = 0.01. For the consumptive
and nonconsumptive orientation variables, sample size only includes those in each class who had targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in the last 5 years (n = 412 for
class 1, 255 for class 2).

Variable
Target Blueﬁn Tuna
New England
New York/New Jersey
Mid-Atlantic
Consumptive orientation
Nonconsumptive orientation
High income

Description
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

who have targeted Blueﬁn Tuna in last 5 years
New England permit holders
New York/New Jersey permit holders
mid-Atlantic permit holders
with consumptive orientation
with nonconsumptive orientation
with annual income >$150,000

Class 1 (n = 523)

Class 2 (n = 457)

78.8**
36.7
35.6
27.7*
35.2
33
38.1*

55.7**
30.9
32.4
37.0*
37.3
28.2
28.6*

